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Dynamics in the governance of collectiveirrigation systems: Evidence from field 
experiments in Nicaragua 
 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this study is to analyze the common pool resource appropriation and public 
good provisiondecisions in a dynamic setting, testing the differences in behavior and 
performance between lab and field subjects. We performeda total of 45 games in Nicaragua, 
including 88 villagers in rural communities and 92 undergraduate students. In order to analyze 
sequential decision making, we introduce a dynamic and asymmetric irrigation game that 
combines the typical social dilemmas associated to irrigation systems management.In addition, 
in 9 out of 22 villagers’ groups, we implemented a treatment that included the disclosure of 
subjects’ appropriation of the common pool resource. The results reveal that the provision of 
individuals’ appropriation level results in higher appropriation in subsequent rounds.  In 
addition, the results show that non-treated villagers provide more public good than treated 
villagers but if compared with students the differences are not significant. The results also 
suggest that appropriation levels are below the Nash prediction of full appropriation, but above 
the social efficient level. This results in an efficiency loss in the game that can be explained to a 
large extent by individual decisions on appropriation and public good contribution and by group 
appropriation behavior. 
 
Keywords: common pool resource, public good, field experiments, dynamic game, irrigation, 
Nicaragua 
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1. Introduction 
Low investment in operation and maintenance activities is often considered as one of the main 
causes of poor irrigation performance. While initial irrigation investments are in many cases 
supported by development and government projects, infrastructure maintenance is often left in 
the hand of farmers.In those cases of poor on-farm water use efficiency and inefficient water 
allocationalong the system,the benefits from irrigation infrastructure turn out to be lower than 
projectedand asymmetries between head and tail-enders of the system emerge 
(Chakravorty&Roumasset, 1991). This evidence suggests that much of the long-term success of 
irrigation systems depends on the operational and maintenance activities,which very 
oftenrequire a certain degree of collective action (Meinzen-Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2002).  
Irrigation systems face two simultaneous collective action problems related to common pool 
resource appropriation and provision decisions (Baland&Platteau, 1996; de Janvry et al., 1998; 
Janssen et al., 2012). On the one hand, the organization must ensure the public good provision 
of the physical and ecological infrastructure to distribute and utilize water resources. On the 
other hand, there exists the irrigation dilemma where the relative positions along the system 
generate asymmetric access to the resource. Asymmetric access to the resource adds additional 
complexity to the traditional social dilemma between the individuals’ extraction that maximizes 
individual payoffs, and the group’s interest that drives to resource conservation maximizing 
social payoffs. In their analysis of provision and appropriation in the commons, de Janvry et al. 
(1998) suggest that the level of provision depends on the rules of appropriation and the quality 
of cooperation achieved in appropriation.  
Inclination to cooperate in social dilemmas has been tested through different experimental 
games in the form of prisoner’s dilemma, voluntary contribution mechanism and the common 
pool resource game (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008).  A common finding is that the average 
player tends to deviate from the pure selfish maximizer of individual payoffs, even when there 
are incentives to free-ride (Cardenas, 2011).These results suggest that individuals’ decisions 
may be mediated by other factors in addition to objective payoffs (Ostrom, 2000; Cardenas, 
2009). Gintis (2000) suggest that patterns of pro-sociality and preferences over time and risk are 
related to environmental outcomes.  
In this paper we present the results from field experiments performed in Nicaragua with 
villagers in rural communities and undergraduate students of a Nicaraguan university 
(Universidad NacionalAutónoma de Nicaragua, Facultad Regional de Matagalpa). The objective 
of this study is to analyze the common pool resource appropriation and public good 
provisiondecisions in a dynamic setting, testing the differences in behavior and performance 
between lab and field subjects.  
In order to analyze sequential resource appropriation and public good provision, we introduce a 
dynamic and asymmetric irrigation game that combines players interacting in both a common-
pool resource appropriation game and in public good provision strategies. Similarly to the setup 
of Janssen et al. (2011, 2012), our experiment includes two stages: an appropriation stage and a 
provision stage. In the appropriation stage, a common pool resource, in this case framed as 
water from an irrigation system, can be extracted. As in Osés-Eraso&Viladrich-Grau (2011), the 
resource is exogenously given only in the first round, and it is endogenously determined by the 
agents’ extraction and provision strategies in subsequent rounds. In the public good provision 
stage, subjects decide how much to invest in a public fund to operational and maintenance 
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activities that determines the water available in the irrigation system for the next round. Both 
stages are played in sequential turns from upstream to downstream positions assigned randomly 
to players.   
Recent studies including the provision problem indicate that differences in experiences with 
natural resources management do not have a significant effect for most decisions (Janssen et al., 
2012; Janssen et al., 2011). In contrast, the expectations of trustworthiness of others in the 
community determine the initial level of cooperation. The share upstream participants take from 
the resource affect the cooperative behavior of downstream players, producing a synergic 
process between efficiency and equity. In this paper, we are interested in showing the relation 
between appropriation and public good contribution decisions. In this respect, we specifically 
exploit the results by analyzing these decisions among students and villagers groups.   
2. The irrigation game 
The irrigation game builds on the common-pool resource experiments developed by Osés-
Eraso&Viladrich-Grau (2011, 2007) and Janssen et al. (2011). For the purpose of this game, all 
variables are measured in points. In our experiment a group ofn players share a common pool 
water resource ofFo points. Each participant is randomly assigned to a position (i.e. P1, P2, ..., 
Pn) with sequential access to the resource, which remains fixed all over the game. P1 has the 
first choice to harvest water (i.e. points) from the common pool resource. Then P2 is next to 
harvest water from whatever amount was left by P1, and so on. In the first round, participants 
receive an equal endowment ofepoints, but in the subsequent rounds endowment changes along 
the game depending on the appropriation and provision decisions. Therefore, after round 1 each 
player’s endowment is endogenously defined (eit). First, each participant, in sequential turns 
from upstream (P1) to downstream (Pn),makes a decision on how many pointsxitwill extractfrom 
the common pool water resource available.Appropriations from the common resource yield an 
individual marginal benefit ofwpoints, but cause the common resource a marginal reduction 
ofcpoints.Each point kept (not appropriated) has a marginal valuefor the agent ofαpoints. Let 
xitbe the appropriation of player i in round t, the appropriation payoff the player obtains in that 
round will be:  
ݖ௜௧
஺ ൌ ݓݔ௜௧ ൅ ߙሺ݁௜௧ െ ݔ௜௧ሻ (1) 
wherew>α.After the appropriation decisions of round t, the remaining common pool resource 
(ܨ௧஺ሻ is equal to the common pool resource that remained from the previous round (ܨ௧ିଵሻ less 
the total common pool resource appropriation by the group. ܨ௧஺is provided to all agents when 
second stage is initialized: 
ܨ௧஺ ൌ ܨ௧ିଵ െ ܿ ∑ ݔ௜௧
௡
௜ୀଵ  (2) 
Second, in the public good provision stage, each player decides how much to contribute to a 
fund for operational and maintenance activities. Points invested in this fund (ݕ௜௧)result in a 
marginal reduction ofβpoints of individual’s payoffs butyield a marginal increase of the 
common pool resource in mpoints. After the public good provision decisions of round t, the 
remaining common resource that subjects share for the next round of investments is: 
ܨ௧ ൌ ܨ௧஺ ൅ ݉ ∑ ݕ௜௧
௡
௜ୀଵ  (3) 
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Under this two-stage asymmetric game, the earnings of each participant in round t is the result 
of appropriation (xit) and provision (yit) decisions. The resulting payoff zit for player i in round t 
is, therefore, defined as the appropriation payoff less the public good provision expenditure: 
ݖ௜௧ ൌ ݖ௜௧
஺ െ ߚݕ௜௧ (4) 
Given the dynamic nature of the game, the endowment of subject i in round tis defined by the 
following expression:   
݁௜௧ ൌ ݂݁݅ݐ ൌ 1, ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ݊ 
݁௜௧ ൌ ݖ௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ݂݅ݐ ൐ 1 (5) 
Appropriation decisions can be taken as long as the common pool resource maintains a positive 
value. For the purpose of this experiment, decisions can be taken over a maximum of T rounds, 
but this information is not available to participants. If the last round T is reached, the remaining 
water resource, FT, is equally distributed among the four members of the group. Suppose a total 
number of t* rounds are played, then the total payoff ziobtained by player i is equal to:   
ݖ௜௧൅ 
ி೅
௡
݂݅ݐכ ൑ ܶܽ݊݀ܨ் ൐ 0 
ݖ௜௧݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ (6) 
Early-extinction of the game takes place when the common-pool resource takes a negative or 
zero value in a period t*<T. In order to describe the traditional social dilemma associated with 
common pool resources we assume that extraction is more efficient from the individual 
perspective, while non-appropriation is more efficient from the collectiveperspective. 
Thatis,ݓ െ ܿ ൏ ߙ ൏ ݓ െ ௖
௡
 (Osés-Eraso & Viladrich-Grau, 2007; Osés-Eraso et al., 2008). This 
game also includes a second social dilemma in the public good provision stage as௠
௡
൏ ߚ ൏ ݉.  
Via backward induction we find that, with conditions described in the previous paragraph, if 
participants were rational self-interested individuals they would choose full-appropriation till 
the resource is depleted and none would invest in operational and maintenance activities. Since 
the upstream player is expected to invest all his endowment in common-pool resource 
appropriation, downstream participants will not contribute to public good provision. Therefore, 
for player 1 there is no benefit to invest when others do not. Thus, the Nash equilibrium for this 
game is that all invest the initial endowment in common pool resource appropriation and 
nobody contributes to operational and maintenance activities. However, the social optimum 
solution, assuming fully cooperating individuals, is achieved when players do not invest in 
appropriation activities, but invest all their endowment in public good provision activities. 
These outcomes provide the benchmarks of possible outcomes in the experiment. 
3. Experimental design and procedure  
Experiments were performed between July and August 2012 with undergraduate students and 
villagers in Nicaragua. The experiment was presented as an irrigation game both at the 
university and ruralcommunities. The typical experiment lasted for about two hours, and up to 
three hours in the rural case. Each participant took partonly in one experimental session. 
Participants knew who else was participating, but they were not allowed to communicate during 
the experiment. All players were assigned a code at the beginning of the session in order to 
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ensure anonymity for the game and the surveys. University students were recruited via word of 
mouth from the economics and agronomy degrees at the Universidad NacionalAutónoma de 
Nicaragua in the cities of Jinotega and Matagalpa, both located at the Central Region of 
Nicaragua. Villagers were recruited via word of mouth and flyers inviting participants 14 years 
and older to take part in the game. Only one person from the same household was allowed to 
participate in the same group. During the experimental sessions, assistance was offered to those 
participants who had difficulties with writing and/or arithmetic. In addition, subjects were told 
that the points earned in the last round would be exchange for cash. On average, earnings per 
student amounted 2$ and per villager 1$. In the case of villagers, a show-up fee of 1$ was given.  
Both in the experiments with students and withvillagers, participants were randomly assigned to 
the groups.Groups were composed of n=4 players, each of whom received an initial endowment 
e=20 points. The initial size of the common pool resource is Fo=240 points. At the appropriation 
stage, each point invested in appropriation yields a marginal (individual) benefit of w=2, and 
decreases the common pool water resource by c=3. Each unit not invested in appropriation 
produces a marginal benefit α=1. In the public good provision stage, each point invested in a 
fund for operational and maintenance activities produces an individual costβ=1 and increases 
the common pool resource bym=1.5.  
After instructions and a practice round, participants played for a maximum of T=10 rounds. The 
game finished if the group reached 10 rounds, but participants did not know in advance the 
maximum number of rounds they would play. The remaining common water resource, equally 
distributed among the group players in the last round, can take any value FT within the closed 
interval [0, 360]. 
Experiments with undergraduate students included 92 participants (23 groups of 4 people), and 
were performed using pencil and paper. The average age of the students was 21 years (Std. Dev. 
2.3), and 46% of them were female. In addition, 86% of them were coming from an urban 
setting and 62% reported not having any previous experience on water resources 
management.Group composition is summarized in Table 1.  
Experiments in the field were conducted in seven different rural communities in the Department 
of Jinotega. All the communities are located in the Upper Sub-basin of Rio Viejo. Rio Viejo 
basin is the major watershed in Nicaragua and includes the Lake Cocibolca, which is the major 
water reservoir in Central America. A total of 88 subjects, 48 females and 40 males, participated 
in 22 groups.In the field experiment, we implemented a treatment that included private 
information. In 9 out of 22 groups, after the 4th round, individual extraction of the common pool 
resource was made public before the second stage of the game, in which the participants had to 
decide how much to contribute to operational and maintenance activities of the public 
infrastructure. The introduction of this new information allows us to test whether providing 
individual extraction level exerts any sanctioning effect that results in significant differences in 
subsequent public good provision and extraction levels. The number of groups by sex 
composition in each treatment is reported in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Number of groups by sex composition and treatments in rural communities. 
Group composition N student groups 
(N players) 
N villagers groups (N players) 
T1 no information T2 information** 
4 males 5(20) 3 (12) 2(8) 
4 females 8 (32) 5 (20) 2(8) 
2 males & 2 females 4 (16) 2 (8) 2(8) 
1 males & 3 females 2 (8) 1 (4) 2(8) 
3 males &1 female 4 (16) 2 (8) 1(4) 
Total 23 (92) 13 (52) 9 (36) 
Note: *In these groups, after round four, individual extraction levels were publicly shared 
among the group members.  
 
Farming is the major source of income in the households of 81 out of 88 participants. The 
average age of villagers was 34 years (Std. Dev. 13.3). In terms of the maximum level of 
education attained, 9% had no formal education, 3% are literate, 36% completed primary 
studies, 34% had secondary studies and 16% received technical or university training.  
4. Results 
This section reports the main descriptive results, and provides individual and group level 
analyses of appropriation and public good provision decisions along the game. As shown in 
Fig.1, most groups in both student and villagers’ gamesreached round 10. This shows that most 
groups managed to not deplete the common pool resource despite individual incentives to invest 
all the endowment in common pool resource appropriation. It should be noted that in the case of 
village groups under treatment a higher proportion reached round 10 (6 out of 9 groups) and any 
of the groups depleted the resource before round 8.  
Fig. 1-Group distribution by maximum round reached in the game. 
 
4.1. Appropriation and provision decisions 
Data in Fig. 2 shows average appropriation and common pool resource (CPR) available initially 
at Stage 1 of each round. Results shows that appropriation levels (in green) are below the Nash 
prediction of full appropriation (blue), but above the social efficient level. 
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Fig. 2- Average appropriation and available CPR at Stage 1 of each round for each treatment 
group. 
 
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant effect of treatment group (i.e. students, non-treated 
villagers and treated villagers) on appropriation decisions along the game (X2df=2 = 15.10, p-
value = 0.0005). Considering appropriation decisions before and after round 4 of the game, 
there is a significant difference between treatment groups in the appropriation decisions 
distribution before round 4 (X2df=2 = 18.82, p-value = 0.0001). However, differences in 
appropriation decisions are not significant after round 4 among treatment groups. A post-hoc 
test Mann-Whitney-U test showed significant differences between non-treated and treated 
villagers appropriation decisions (z=3.983, p-value=0.0001).We can conclude that non-treated 
villagers appropriate more than treated villagers. However, the Mann-Whitney-U test reveals 
that these differences are only significant when considering appropriation decisions before 
round 4 (z=3.189, p-value = 0.0014). Non-treated villagers rank higher than treated 
subjects.There is no significant difference between non-treated and treated subjects after round 
4 (z=0.588, p-value= 0.557). Differences in the underlying distributions of the appropriation of 
students and non-treated villagers are not significant at 5% level of significance (z=-1.924, 
p=0.054). 
In addition to appropriation decisions, we are also interested in looking at the distribution of 
appropriation decisions with respect to the available CPR at Stage 1 of each round. For this 
purpose, we generate an additional variable defined as the ratio between CPR appropriation and 
available CPR. Fig. 3 shows average share appropriation for each round and for each treatment 
group. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that treatment group has a significant effect on the share of 
appropriation with respect to available CPR (X2df=2 = 16.540, p-value= 0.0003). Comparing the 
samples by pairs, there is a significant difference between treated and non-treated villager’s 
subjects (Mann-Whitney-U test, z = 3.858, p-value= 0.0001). Non-treated subjects 
rankedhigher. In addition, the difference is also significant between non-treated villagers and 
students (z = 3.253, p-value= 0.0011). Non-treated villagers rank higher than students. 
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Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alternatives reveals that, in the case of students, 
appropriation share decreases along the game (J=-2.501, p-value =0.0062). The test result for 
non-treated villagers shows that the null hypothesis of same underlying distribution for each 
round cannot be rejected. In the treated villagers we can conclude that appropriation share 
increases along the game (J= 2.554, p-value= 0.0053). 
Fig. 3- Average share of appropriation with respect to CPR available in Stage 1 of each round. 
The error bars indicate the confidence interval for each group treatment in each round.  
 
With respect to the common pool resource available at Stage 1 of the game, a Kruskal-Wallis 
test shows that differences among treatments are significant at the 0.01 significance level 
(X2df=2= 29.83, p-value = 0.0001). However, a Mann-Whitney-U test shows that differences 
between treated and non-treated villagers are not significant (z=-1.720, p-value= 0.0855). There 
is a significant difference between students and non-treated villagers (z=5.147, p-value 
=0.0000). In this case, students ranked higher. 
Differences in the distribution of public good provision decisions are statistically significant 
among treatment groups (Kruskal-Wallis test, X2df=2= 14.281, p-value= 0.0008). Pairs’ 
comparison shows that there is a significant difference between non-treated and treated villagers 
(Mann-Whitney-U test, z = 3.919, p-value= 0.0001). Non-treated villagers invest more in public 
good provision than treated villagers. However, there is no significant difference between non-
treated villagers and students (Mann-Whitney-U test, z = -0.951, p-value= 0.3415). Spearman 
correlation shows that the relationship between appropriation and public good provision 
decisions is statistically significant in all group treatment’s subjects (Students: rho=0.6539, p-
value= 0.0000; Non-treated villagers: rho=0.5403, p-value= 0.0000; Treated villagers: rho= 
0.4920, p-value= 0.0000).  
Overall, these results suggest that non-treated villagers appropriate more than treated villagers. 
In addition, appropriation share with respect to available CPR is also higher for non-treated than 
treated villagers, but distribution of the available CPR is not statistically different for both 
treated and non-treated villagers. With respect to public good provision, non-treated villagers 
also provide more public good than treated villagers, which confirms the positive and 
significant correlation between appropriation and public good provision. Distribution of 
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appropriation decisions is not significantly different for students and non-treated villagers. 
However, appropriation share of non-treated villagers is higher than that of students, while 
available CPR is higher for students than for non-treated villagers despite there is no significant 
difference in public good provision among subjects from both groups.  
In considering the asymmetry in the order of appropriation decisions, we observe that there is a 
significant difference in the distribution of average appropriation among positions. Average 
results are presented in Fig. 4. While in the students treatment group average appropriation 
increases with players’ position (Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alternatives J* = 4.091, p-
value= 0.0000), the opposite takes place in the non-treated (J = -1.552, p-value= 0.0603) and 
treated villagers’ groups (J= -2.906, p-value= 0.0018).  
Fig. 4- Average appropriation by player position and treatment group. 
 
4.2. Game and last round earnings  
Fig. 5 summarizes game earnings and earnings in the last round by group treatment. As 
described earlier in the paper, the difference between both variables is due to the CPR available 
at the last round, which is equally distributed among the four players. Therefore, game earnings 
equal the private earnings in the last round plus the corresponding share of the CPR. There is no 
significant difference in the distribution of game earnings among treatment groups (Kruskal-
Wallis test, X2df=2= 5.866, p-value= 0.0532), neither in the distribution of earnings in the last 
round (Kruskal-Wallis test, X2df=2= 0.737, p-value= 0.6919). In addition, we do not find 
evidence of significant differences in game earnings and last round earnings between treated 
and non-treated villagers. But we find significant differences in the distribution of game 
earnings between students and non-treated villagers(Mann-Whitney-U test, z = 2.406, p-value= 
0.0161). Students rank higher than non-treated villagers. However, there is no significant 
difference between students and non-treated villagers earnings in the last round. These results 
are in line with the previous findings showing the differences in CPR availability between 
students and non-treated villagers games. Thus, in the case of students there is a larger share of 
CPR to distribute among group players.  
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Fig. 5- Game earnings and earnings in the last round by group treatment.  
 
4.3. Individual-level efficiency in the game 
Game results can be analyzed on an efficiency basis. For this purpose, we define economic 
efficiency as the difference between potential earnings and actual earnings. Potential game 
earnings are considered as the maximum a player can earn subject to all the other players in the 
group reach that maximum. In this respect, it is not a private optimum, but a socialoptimum. 
Given our game design, potential earnings amount to 90 points. The difference between 
potential and actual earnings is considered as a loss of efficiency. In this respect, smaller 
differences imply smaller losses of the efficiency.  
Fig. 6 below shows efficiency loss distribution by treatment. Kruskal-Wallis test suggests that 
there is a significant difference in efficiency distributions among groups at 5% confidence level 
(X2df=2= 6.572, p-value= 0.0374). In addition, Mann-Whitney-U test shows that efficiency 
distribution between treated and non-treated villagers groups is not significantly different (z= 
1.471, p-value= 0.1413). However, differences in efficiency distribution between students and 
non-treated villagers groups are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney-U test, z= -2.539, p-
value= 0.0111). We can conclude that non-treated villagers rank higher than students with 
respect to loss of efficiency.  
Fig. 6 – Histogram of efficiency loss by treatment group.  
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Distribution differences by sex are not statistically significant except in the students’ case, in 
which males experienced higher losses of efficiency than females (Mann-Whitney-U test, z= 
2.928, p-value= 0.0034).  
There might be different explanations for differences in the loss of efficiency. Thus, given our 
game design, we can test whether smaller losses of individual economic efficiency arerelated to 
early resource depletion, as subjects might deplete the resource by appropriating in early rounds 
and not contributing to public good provision. However, the correlation coefficient between the 
number of rounds reached at the end of the game and loss of efficiency is not significant. 
Spearman correlation test suggests that the null hypothesis of independence between efficiency 
loss and the maximum reached in the game cannot be rejected (rho= 0.0652, p-value= 0.3883). 
In this respect, there isn’t a relationship between the maximum round reached in the game and 
the loss of individual efficiency.  
In addition, we are interested in analyzing to what extent individual characterization as either 
high or low appropriator and high or low contributor relates to the efficiency loss. For this 
purpose, we introduce a new variable named appropriator. This variable computes the average 
individual appropriation behavior along the game and can range between 0, when the individual 
behaves as a low appropriator in every played round, and 1, when the individual is characterized 
as a high appropriator in every round. A subject is a low appropriator when his appropriation 
level is below the groups’ average appropriation in a certain round. The opposite holds for a 
high appropriation. Furthermore, we also introduce a variable accounting for average group 
composition in terms of number of high and/or low appropriatorsin a group along the game. For 
a specific round, group (appropriators) composition takes value 1 when all members are high 
appropriators, 0.75 in case 3 out of 4 players are high appropriators, 0.50 if 2 are high 
appropriators and 0.25 when only one member is a high appropriator. In a similar way, we 
define the public good provision behavior as an individual (contributor) and as a group (group 
contributor composition).  
Table 2 reports regression results explaining individual efficiency loss. We present an aggregate 
model for the three treatment groups and a separate model including a dummy variable that 
accounts for the treatment group. Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity reveals that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant variance and, therefore, standard errors estimation 
is robust. As expected, individual appropriation behavior has a negative and significant effect on 
efficiency loss. However, group aggregate behavior has a positive effect on efficiency loss, 
which reflects the traditional social dilemma associated with common pool resources. On the 
other hand, individual contribution behavior has a positive and significant impact on efficiency 
loss, while group contribution behavior reflects a negative and not significant effect on 
efficiency loss. The introduction of the treatment group dummy variable decreases the 
significance of group composition in terms of number of appropriators and increases the 
significance of the constant, which accounts for the subjects included in the students treatment 
group. Non-treated villagers correlate positively with higher efficiency losses.  
In sum, individual efficiency loss is significantly correlated to individual contribution and 
appropriation behavior with respect to the group average behavior. In addition, group 
composition regarding the number of high or low appropriators has also a significant and 
negative effect on individual efficiency. This effect is not significant when considering group 
composition in terms of players’ contribution to public good provision.  
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Table 2. Regression results for individual level data explaining game efficiency loss. Between 
brackets are the standard deviations. We used Ordinary Least Squares, and the significance level 
is reported by adjusted R2.  
Efficiency loss  Model 1 Model 2 
Constant  29.002** 
(12.445) 
36.576*** 
(13.037) 
Game duration (round max) 0.977** 
(0.495) 
1.183** 
(0.522) 
Appropriator  -33.731*** 
(4.313) 
-33.544*** 
(4.281) 
Group appropriator composition 58.750*** 
(15.689) 
36.709* 
(18.618) 
Contributor  30.860*** 
(5.092) 
30.446*** 
(5.057) 
Group contributor composition -7.522 
(18.812) 
-7.378 
(0.699) 
Non-treated villagers  6.361** 
(3.108) 
Treated villagers   -0.598 
(2.946) 
N 177 177 
Adj. R2 0.2782 0.2820 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper presents an asymmetric game that combines a common pool resource and a public 
good game. Collective action problems related to both common pool resource appropriation and 
public good provision are typically presented in irrigation systems. The experimental design of 
this game attempts to reflect this type of irrigation social dilemmas and analyze the behavior of 
students and villagers when confronted with these decisions. The results reveal that there is no 
significant difference between appropriation decisions of students and non-treated villagers. 
However, non-treated villagers appropriate more common pool resource than treated villagers, 
but this difference is only significant before round 4. That is, once private information on 
others’ appropriation level is made public in the treated villagers groups, the difference in the 
distribution of appropriation decisions between non-treated and treated villagers is not 
significant. In this respect, the provision of individuals’ appropriation level results in higher 
appropriation in subsequent rounds.   
Common pool resource appropriation and public good provision decisions are positively 
correlated. In this respect, the results show that non-treated villagers provide more public good 
than treated villagers. However, this difference is not significant between students and non-
treated villagers. Both appropriation and provision decisions affect subjects’ game earnings. 
Thus, despite students’ individual earnings in the last round are below the ones of non-treated 
villagers, as the common pool resource is significantly higher for students, game earnings are 
higher for students than for non-treated villagers.  
Our results show, furthermore, that, appropriation levelsare below the Nash prediction of full 
appropriation, but above the social efficient level. In this respect, there is an efficiency loss in 
the game, which is higher for villagers than for students. This efficiency loss can be explained 
to a large extent by individual decisions on appropriation and public good contribution and by 
  13
group appropriation behavior. In this sense, it is also worth noting the asymmetry in the decision 
process. While in the case of students’ appropriation increases with the position, the opposite 
takes place in villagers’ games. This asymmetry in access might, in turn, affect the efficiency of 
the game.  
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